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The large number of names on terrorism watch lists raises the problem of monitoring. Given the existing 
resource constraints and other logistical considerations, efficient and accurate ranking of individuals in 
terms of threat posed is of paramount importance. This process, however, may be impacted by reference 
points, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion and other aspects of the human decision-making process that 
introduce biases. This paper explores the relevance of decision-making processes and biases to the specific 
task of ranking and monitoring individuals whose names have been placed on a terrorism watch list.  
 
A watch list is a list of individuals and groups who are known or reasonably suspected of being involved in 
terrorism and who are, as a result, potentially subject to surveillance and other restrictions.1 It must be 
noted at the outset that not everyone whose name is on a terrorism watch list must be watched all of the 
time for a watch list to ‘work’. A terrorism watch list is also a mechanism.2 An individual’s name added to a 
terrorism watch list should trigger an alert to authorities if, for example, that individual purchases a firearm 
or tries to board a flight. This trigger mechanism, when functioning effectively, will go a long way towards 
circumventing terrorist actions without significant surveillance resources being allocated. Despite this, 
there will always be some cases where, for one reason or another, the watch list mechanism fails and 
questions are inevitably raised about why an individual whose name was on a terrorism watch list was not 
being watched. This has been highlighted in a number of recent cases. In Australia, the perpetrator who 
shot several police officers during a terrorist incident in Melbourne in June 2017 was on a terrorism watch 
list. The elder of the two Boston Marathon bombers was on a terrorism watch list. So were the murderers 
of British soldier Lee Rigby in London.3 So were two of the three London bridge attackers4 and the Berlin 
Christmas market attacker had been under surveillance on suspicion of planning to acquire automatic 
weapons for use in a terrorist attack.5,6 Examples like this have emerged with increasing frequency.  
 A watch list is not the only type of list that governments and their agencies have developed to 
circumvent terrorist activity. In the United Kingdom, for example, HM Treasury in conjunction with the 
Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) prepares a publicly available list of ‘Designated 
Persons, Terrorism and Terrorist Financing’, the purpose of which is to enforce financial sanctions, usually 
asset freezes, against individuals and entities associated with terrorism. For example, the 2017 Designated 
Persons, Terrorism and Terrorist Financing list includes an entry for the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO), 
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which is associated with a number of targeted groups (Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, 
Fatah Revolutionary Council and Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims).7 In the United Kingdom, 
financial institutions must comply with the Terrorist Asset Freezing Act 2010 (TAFA) by ensuring that any 
accounts held by the listed individuals or entities are frozen, that no financial services are provided and a 
report is made to the OFSI if listed individuals or entities attempt to engage in financing activity. If a list 
such as this works effectively, the financing of terrorist activity should be impeded and financing patterns 
added to the stock of collected intelligence. Different lists with different mechanisms each contribute a part 
to the counter-terrorism infrastructure.  
 In this paper we are primarily concerned with the development and management of terrorism 
watch lists and, especially, with the decision-making process of prioritisation or ranking of listed 
individuals and groups for different degrees of surveillance or restriction. In 2017 a list of Islamic State 
recruits was recovered during an operation in Syria and Iraq. Interpol circulated the list of names among 
its members, seeking additional information such as border crossings, social media activity and criminal 
history that might be held by European governments and agencies. The information would then be used to 
decide whether an individual would be elevated to a higher level of surveillance.8 This is an example of the 
type of process that we concentrate on.  
At all critical points during the development and management of a terrorism watch list, decisions 
must be made. These include: (1) the decision to add an individual’s name to a terrorism watch list; (2) the 
decision to subject a particular individual to closer surveillance; (3) the decision to discontinue 
surveillance; and (4) the decision to remove an individual from the watch list. We are most interested in 
the second of these decisions but our conclusions apply equally well to the others. With limited resources, 
the surveillance of individuals must be prioritised and resources allocated to the monitoring of high risk 
individuals. Arriving at a conclusion regarding which individuals represent a more significant security 
concern than others involves decision-making processes that are not always free from biases or errors. We 
identify some relevant decision-making biases that impact upon any ranking procedure and explore their 
implications for the efficient prioritising or ranking of individuals for surveillance. To accomplish this we 
draw mainly on Tversky and Kahneman’s9 behavioural-descriptive model of the decision-making process 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty, cumulative prospect theory (CPT).    
 
Terrorism Watch Lists: Construction, Challenges and Legal Considerations 
In the first instance, a terrorism watch list is built from intelligence. Detecting a potential threat and 
deciding whether the individual’s name will be added to the watch list is itself a complex task.10 In the 
United States, the terrorism watch list consists of two components. The first is called the Terrorist Identities 
Datamart Environment (TIDE). The second, which is really ‘the’ list, is called the Consolidated Terrorist 
Screening Database (CTSD). Intelligence submitted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Department of Defence (DOD) and other 
agencies is assessed by the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC). The NCTC then decides whether or 
not to nominate an individual for inclusion on the CTSD. The nomination flows to the FBI-administered 
Terrorist Screening Centre (TSC) and, if accepted, the individual’s name is added to the list accessed and 
monitored by various specialist agencies in conjunction with state and local law enforcement. For example, 
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the Transport Security Administration (TSA) utilises the CTSD as the basis for its ‘no fly’ list.11 The other 
agencies and task forces, of course, continue any monitoring activities and investigations. New intelligence 
is continually gathered and assessed. Specific investigative or law enforcement actions will be initiated 
when triggered by some event, such as an individual whose name is on a ‘no fly’ list attempting to board a 
flight.   
The management of terrorism watch lists utilises advanced technology, particularly with regards 
to surveillance of communications and internet activity. Even so, the amount of data collected makes it 
difficult for any algorithm or computer program to identify a pattern of behaviour and trigger surveillance 
or other investigative action. The case of the Orlando nightclub shooting in June 2016 starkly illustrates 
some of the most pressing challenges. Following credible information provided in 2013, the FBI opened a 
preliminary investigation into the eventual shooter, Omar Mateen. He was subjected to surveillance and 
even interviewed twice during a 10-month long investigation. His name was added to a terrorism watch 
list. The investigation was closed when no evidence emerged to support the conclusion that Mateen was a 
credible and imminent threat to security.12 His online activity, which when considered holistically might 
have provided enough evidence to maintain Mateen’s terrorism watch list status, was not red flagged by 
any surveillance algorithm operating at the time. His name was removed from the terrorism watch list in 
2014. When he legally purchased the firearms he used in the nightclub attack, during which he killed 49 
people, the FBI received no notification.13  
 In Europe, where cooperation and communication between the agencies of different governments 
is critical, the watch list mechanism may fail because of communication breakdowns. When these occur, an 
individual who has been placed on a terrorism watch list in one European country may fail to be added to 
the watch list of another country. The case of Youssef Zaghba, one of the London Bridge attackers, illustrates 
the challenges involved in efficiently and effectively managing terrorism watch lists across multiple 
jurisdictions. Zaghba was detained in Italy in early 2016 after he raised suspicions while boarding a flight 
to Istanbul and was later found to possess Islamic State material. He was released soon after but was being 
monitored. His name was added to the Schengen Information System (SIS), a shared database that is 
designed to alert member nations to security threats. Even though his name appeared in this database, 
Zaghba travelled in and out of Britain on at least two occasions without being seriously challenged. Despite 
being known to Italian authorities, Zaghba’s name was not placed on the UK terrorism watch list.14 
Communication between agencies operating in different jurisdictions represents a major challenge. So too 
does the sheer length of the terrorism watch lists.    
 In the United Kingdom, there are more than 20,000 people on the terrorism watch list. Of these, 
more than 10 percent, or around 2000 to 3000 individuals, are the subject of very serious concern on the 
part of intelligence agencies.15 It is impossible to watch all of these people all of the time using physical 
mobile surveillance. To undertake mobile surveillance of one individual for 24 hours requires fielding three 
teams of five agents and even this assumes that a team is not noticed by a suspect and forced to rotate.16 At 
a ratio of 15-to-1, the 24 hour surveillance of just the 3000 individuals who are of ‘most concern’ would 
require 45,000 security agency personnel in the field simultaneously and continuously. Even if such 
manpower could be gathered and such large numbers of suitably qualified individuals recruited and 
trained and funded, there would still remain the exceedingly high equipment and resources costs that such 
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a vast operation would require. The resources that are available for mobile surveillance must be prioritised 
which means prioritising or ranking individuals on the basis of an assessment of the risk they represent. 
Such a ranking is susceptible to errors that emerge from within the decision-making process.  
  In the United States, by 2013 there were more than one million individual names listed in both the 
TIDE and CTSD, about 25,000 of these are the names of US citizens. As mentioned before, this is the basis 
for action taken by specialist agencies including the TSA.17 The TSA’s no fly list contains about 50,000 
names. Less than 1,000 of these are the names of US citizens.18 Other actions can also be triggered. For 
example, non-profit organisations in the US must check employees’ names against the terrorism watch list 
for the organisation to be eligible to receive contributions.19 The US Treasury Department’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) freezes and blocks assets based on details contained in the terrorism watch 
list.20 The expansion of the size and scope of terrorism watch lists has been dramatic when one considers 
that there were just 16 names on the TSA’s no fly list on September 11, 2001. This has been the outcome of 
the vast security initiatives put in place after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.21  
 The management of a terrorism watch list and, indeed, the very existence of a watch list, raises 
various points of law. Problems and subsequent legal challenges began to emerge soon after the rapid 
expansion of the terrorism watch list and no fly list during the early 2000s. These are discussed in detail by 
Florence22 and include the US constitutional right to travel. Miss-identifications have also proved to be a 
long running point of contention.23,24 Expansions in the scope of the terrorism watch list are also subject to 
challenge. For example, following the Orlando night club shooting there were numerous calls for 
individuals on the terrorism watch list to be banned from purchasing firearms.25 That is, a purchase would 
be blocked at the point of sale. The Democratic Senator from California, Dianne Feinstein, had proposed 
such legislation. The proposal was rejected by the Senate in late 2015 and again in mid-2016 following 
intense debate about the effectiveness of such a measure and the potential violation of rights involved in 
restricting firearms purchases, especially when a person’s name could have been mistakenly added to a 
terrorism watch list.26,27  
 The type of information that is gathered about individuals whose names are either on a terrorism 
watch list or who, on the basis of the gathered information, will have their name placed on a terrorism 
watch list has attracted a great deal of commentary. Surveillance methods that we mentioned before, where 
an individual is physically followed during the course of a day, for example, are supplemented by various 
forms of ‘electronic surveillance’. Following the Snowden revelations, the nature of electronic surveillance 
became the subject of intense international debate. In the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigative 
Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, amended by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, governs the use of covert 
techniques by public authorities. Covert techniques include the surveillance methods mentioned before 
(observing a person’s activity in private and public areas) as well as intercepted communications 
(telephone calls, emails), communications data (subscriber details, telephone accounts), electronic data 
protected by encryption or passwords and the use of human intelligence (informants, undercover officers). 
Judicial approval is required prior to the use of covert techniques.28 
 Compliance with RIPA and the legal framework within which the intelligence services operate was 
addressed at length by the UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, in the days following the leak of classified 
material outlining the collection of intelligence by US agencies.29 In his statement to the House of Commons, 
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much emphasis was placed on the role and methods of the Government Communications Head-Quarters 
(GCHQ), the British counterpart of the NSA. The GCHQ is responsible for the collection of communications 
and electronic intelligence. In undertaking this activity, approval in the form of a warrant signed by the 
Foreign Secretary or Home Secretary is required and these approvals are subject to review by the 
Intelligence Services Commissioner. The legal frameworks apply to both the collection of data within the 
United Kingdom and whenever the GCHQ operates internationally or in cooperation with other agencies 
such as the NSA. The legal frameworks governing the collection of communications and electronic 
surveillance continue to be amended both as governments seek to balance democratic oversight and the 
achievement of counter-terrorism objectives and as different jurisdictions make their own amendments 
which, in turn, affect the behaviour of agencies operating from another jurisdiction.  
Such are the issues involving due process and individual rights, both of which run up against the 
margins of the scope and scale of terrorism watch lists, the reach and implications of any potential triggers, 
the possibility for mistaken inclusion and the difficulty in removing one’s name from a list once it is there. 
In prioritising an individual for surveillance, multiple legal processes are brought into play. As a result, any 
ranking or prioritising of individuals becomes even more important because errors will result in lost 
resources, opportunity costs (measured in terms of the hours forgone in applying surveillance to more 
appropriate targets) and legal challenges.  
 
Prioritising or Ranking Criminal Suspects 
The ranking of suspects is common practice in all areas of law enforcement.30 For the most part, this ranking 
is undertaken by investigators and other personnel based on the available information and applying their 
individual and collective experience and intuition. Formal processes are sometimes applied to certain 
suspect ranking tasks and the development of these formal processes and research into their effectiveness 
is where the relevant literature on this matter can be found. Whenever a crime or series of crimes occurs 
and is not immediately solved, investigators will rank suspects according to the degree to which the 
investigative team believes it likely that a particular individual was responsible. This ranking then becomes 
the starting point for the investigation.  
Interestingly, most of the academic work has centred on behavioural-spatial models where 
prioritisation of suspects is based on both behavioural aspects of the unsolved crime and its location. 
Broadly, the primary task is to predict where the perpetrator of offenses resides relative to the location of 
the crime or crime series.31 Offenders with a criminal history who reside near to this determined location 
will be questioned first. This is different, of course, from the task of ranking individuals whose names are 
on a terrorism watch list because these individuals might never have committed a crime. The ranking task 
is one that involves an assessment of the possibility of these individuals committing an act of terrorism. 
The nature of terrorism also requires unique approaches or adjustments to existing approaches. 
Developments in investigative psychology32 and recent advances in the economic analysis of terrorism33 
are beginning to highlight the ways in which theoretical and empirical approaches may assist investigators 
in drawing inferences about unknown terrorist offenders.  
 There are at least several suspect ranking techniques that are applied in criminal investigations. 
These range from basic heuristics to more complex algorithms that are used to prioritise suspects based 
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on the distance between suspects’ residential addresses and the location range that the heuristic or 
algorithm indicates as being most likely to contain the offender’s location.34 Some of these techniques are 
purely spatial but many have embedded within their underlying frameworks a reasonably sophisticated 
psychology of place.35 At the most basic level, there is the circle hypothesis. From a series of crimes, the 
distance between the two crimes that are furthest apart becomes the diameter for the circle that 
geographically encompasses all of the crimes in the series. Canter and Larkin36 hypothesised that the 
offender’s residence would be found inside the circle. Individuals with a criminal history who live within 
the area of a ‘circle’ are prioritised for investigation and questioning. This turns out to be a relatively 
successful approach.  
 A more complex version of the circle hypothesis, drawing on the established fact that serial 
offenders tend to live close by to the location of their first offense, uses the location of the first offense in a 
series to shrink the size of the geographic area to be considered.37 More sophisticated techniques that build 
on the same principles include prioritisation of suspects based on the most recent (rather than first) offense 
in the series38 and Kind’s39 approach which ignores the order in which the offenses occurred and instead 
computes the point that can be connected with the least total distance to all of the offense locations. This 
point is the ‘centre of gravity’ for the offenses (and is most likely to be close to where the offender resides). 
There are also purely algorithmic-based or mathematical-functional approaches that work by minimising 
distance functions.40 Research into the comparative effectiveness of these distance or place-based 
prioritisation techniques is ongoing.41 The concepts and foundations of these techniques are explored 
further by Canter and Youngs.42 
 Innovating upon these techniques involves embedding additional aspects of psychology and 
criminology into the prioritisation process. Snook et al.43 use a combination of criminal history and location  
as the basis for their prioritisation technique. This approach is based on two empirical regularities: (1) 
offenders have a criminal history; and (2) offenders commit crimes close to their home. Rather than simply 
determining a search area and ranking known prior offenders on the basis of their residential addresses in 
relation to the search area, additional criminology-psychology research is incorporated into the analysis. 
In particular, both criminal careers and journey-to-crime research. The crime is mapped and a search area 
identified. The suspect whose criminal history aligns with the unsolved crime and who lives closest to the 
crime’s location is ranked first and so on. The combination of criminal careers and journey-to-crime 
research does appear to improve the results of the process.44 However, there are still wide margins for 
error and the list of suspects can remain large even after the technique is applied. On most occasions the 
list may be so large as to make it infeasible for a local police department to follow up on all of the suspects. 
As such, law enforcement agents will still need to make decisions that narrow the list further. This might 
rely on experience and intuition or it might involve incorporating additional information into the search. 
For example, eyewitness accounts might be used to rule out certain suspects on the basis of age, height or 
ethnicity.45 In all cases, the human decision-making process, which might be improved considerably by the 
use of formal techniques, must still be brought to bear on the problem of ranking and prioritising suspects.  
 As we shall see, human decision-making processes that involve probabilities exhibit systematic 
biases.46 For example, there is a tendency for decision-makers to overweight unlikely outcomes and 
underweight more likely outcomes.47 Although formal probability-based models for suspect ranking are 
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less common in the literature, there are approaches that apply probability measures over various factors 
relevant to the task of suspect prioritisation. For example, Bache et al.48 use language modelling and 
Bayesian probability to prioritise suspects by matching crime descriptions across solved and unsolved 
crimes. Investigators typically enter a 20-word standard crime report into a police database. Each report 
for a solved crime becomes a document that could be relevant or irrelevant to an unsolved crime. 
Probabilistic techniques are used to facilitate efficient document retrieval in many different fields.49 Bache 
et al.50 apply these techniques to suspect prioritisation by transforming the probability of document 
relevance into a probability of suspect likelihood. Suspects are identified because reports of their previous 
crimes align to some degree with the reports of the unsolved crimes. This can be applied to crimes of 
varying levels of seriousness. A suspect may have served a considerable prison sentence for a serious 
offense and the possibility of re-offending must not be overlooked. The likelihood that a suspect is indeed 
the perpetrator is calculated and the suspects are prioritised according to this computed probability. Of 
course, such probabilities must be interpreted and a decision made as to how much weight to accord them. 
No technique draws on a comprehensive dataset and investigators must decide how to treat the results. It 
is here, once more, that judgement involving probabilities enters into the investigative process.  
 
Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty and the Investigative Process 
An ordering or ranking of alternatives is a fundamental concept in the analysis of human decision-making. 
The economic theory of consumer preference, for example, is based on the concept of a scale of preferences 
across alternative consumer goods.51 The concept is also fundamental in decision theory where alternatives 
are not consumer goods but risky prospects (gambles) with a range of possible outcomes each occurring 
with some probability. There are a number of different ways that alternative risky prospects may be 
ordered:52 (1) expected value or basic mathematical expectation;53 (2) expected utility;54 (3) subjective 
expected utility;55,56 (4) stochastic dominance;57 (5) prospect theory;58 (6) CPT;59 and (7) SP/A theory60, 
among others. Each has strengths and weaknesses and each is designed for a particular purpose 
(prediction, description, prescription).61 The careful study of decision-making has yielded a tremendous 
volume of results. Some of the most important of these have been incorporated into the formal models of 
choice. The most prominent of the descriptive models is CPT. We use CPT as the basis for an examination 
of the challenges involved in prioritising watch-listed individuals for surveillance. 
 One of the principal findings of decision theory and the motivation for development of models such 
as CPT is the way in which people deal with risk, uncertainty and probability. Even when chances are 
assessed correctly, decision-makers tend to accord more significance to unlikely outcomes and less 
significance to more likely outcomes.62,63,64,65 This tendency66, along with several others, leads to 
divergences from the optimal rankings that are prescribed by orthodox models such as expected utility 
theory. Based on available information and intelligence, law enforcement agencies prioritise those 
individuals whose names appear on terrorism watch lists based on an assessment that incorporates some 
measure of the likelihood, 𝑝𝑖 , that a particular individual will perpetrate an act of terrorism. This measure 
may be implicit. It may also be subjective. Each individual, 𝑥𝑖 , is expected to perpetrate an act of terrorism 
with probability 𝑝𝑖 , which may be zero. The challenge is to rank these individuals in order according to the 
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threat they represent. This prioritisation is analogous to any type of ordering of prospects under conditions 
of risk and uncertainty.    
   In developing prospect theory and its refined version (CPT), Kahneman and Tversky identified 
several aspects of the decision-making process that had emerged time and again in experimental studies.  
They included these in their descriptive model of the process that people use to order alternatives in 
contexts characterised by risk and uncertainty. The structure of prospect theory can be summarised by 
listing the main findings that are incorporated within it or which flow from it.67 Decision-makers: 
1) Subjectively overweight unlikely outcomes and subjectively underweight more likely outcomes; 
2) Use reference points in assessing alternatives; 
3) Are loss averse; 
4) Take risks to avoid losses and shun risk in order to protect gains.68  
 All but the first of these are directly reflected in the S-shaped ordering (value) function that has 
come to be viewed as the quintessential feature of prospect theory. In Figure 1, the way in which decision-
makers order alternatives is depicted by a function that is S-shaped and inflects around a reference point. 
The reference point may be the status quo, it may be ‘zero’ or it may be determined in some other way. For 
example, Phillips and Pohl69 argue that the terrorist or terrorist group forms a reference point based on the 
outcomes that other terrorist attacks have generated (number of fatalities). Investigators may also form 
reference points. For example, the characteristics of a most recent perpetrator.  
In the domain of gains, to the right of the reference point, the decision-maker’s value function is 
concave to reflect a formal mathematical property of risk aversion. That is, a risk averse individual would 
prefer to receive outcome 𝑎 for sure than to participate in a gamble 𝑥 with an expected value of 𝑎 (and a 
chance of some amount greater or less than 𝑎). After experiencing gains, the decision-maker tries to protect 
them. The opposite is the case for the domain of losses. Here the decision-maker’s value function is convex 
to reflect risk seeking. Rather than accept a sure loss of 𝑏, the decision-maker now prefers to participate in 
a gamble and is willing to bear the risk of losing more in taking the chance of losing some amount less or, 
better still, not losing at all. This risk seeking behaviour to avoid losses derives from the decision-maker’s 
loss aversion.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
 If we think about the task of prioritising suspects whose names appear on terrorism watch lists in 
these conceptual terms, it is possible to glimpse the (unintended) ways in which such an ordering may be 
shaped. This is not just a matter of pointing out the source of potential errors but the influence of systematic 
aspects of the decision-making process. A decision-maker is less sensitive to those outcomes whose 
probabilities are further away from either 0 or 1. This is called ‘diminishing sensitivity’. An outcome that 
has a likelihood of occurring 90 percent of the time may be accorded a decision weight that is somewhat 
less than 0.90. This does not mean that the decision-maker errs in underestimating the probability. 
Knowing full well what it means for something to have a 90 percent chance of occurrence, the decision-
maker accords it less weight. At the other end of the probability distribution, when an outcome has a 10 
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percent chance of occurrence it is accorded more weight. Again, not because of an error but because of the 
way that uncertain outcomes are treated during the decision-making process.70  
Diminishing sensitivity explains why certain suspects attract more attention and why their 
likelihood of offending is underweighted or overweighted. When ranking a list of suspects, the differences 
in the likelihoods that each suspect will offend (or has committed an offense) is critically important. When 
the probability of offending is near 0 or 1, the differences between two suspects’ likelihoods of offending 
appears more substantial. A suspect who is a 10 percent chance of offending appears much more likely to 
offend than a suspect whose chance of offending is 5 percent and, hence, more than proportional weight is 
assigned. Conversely, a suspect who is a 92 percent chance of offending appears much less certain to offend 
than a suspect whose chance of offending is 97 percent and, hence, less than proportional weight is 
assigned. By contrast, two suspects whose chances of offending are 50 percent and 55 percent do not seem 
to be so dramatically different from each other and do not attract the same degree of attention and, hence, 
are accorded weights that are proportionally closer to their actual probabilities of offending. Whether the 
outcomes of a decision-making process are the result of error or some systematic quirkiness, the 
prioritisation may be shaped in unintended and potentially undesirable ways.  
 Let us start with the influence of reference point dependence. An investigator or investigative team 
may form a reference point that shapes the prioritisation of watch listed individuals. A source of such a 
reference point is the most easily recalled (potentially the most recent) characteristics of a successful or 
unsuccessful case.71 In prioritising watch listed individuals 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 , the reference point 𝑥𝑅  is a set of 
remembered characteristics. The degree to which a watch listed individual, say 𝑥1, matches 𝑥𝑅  shapes the 
prioritisation process by pushing 𝑥1 higher up the order of priority or lower down. Unless the 
characteristics of each case are assessed absolutely, without reference to the set of remembered 
characteristics, there is a tendency for watch listed individuals to be accorded more or less priority 
depending on the ease with which they can be mapped against 𝑥𝑅 . This is one way in which previous 
experience can shape the prioritisation process. This may or may not lead to errors in prioritisation. The 
degree of error will, of course, be determined by the degree to which 𝑥𝑅  is reflective of the threat posed by 
𝑥1. A strong (weak) correspondence between 𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑅  tends to increase (decrease) the priority attached 
to the further investigation or surveillance of 𝑥1.  
 The reference point of remembered characteristics, then, focuses the attention of the investigative 
team. Decision-makers display diminishing sensitivity at points further and further from the reference 
point. A watch listed individual, say 𝑥2, may not be close to 𝑥𝑅  and may be accorded less attention than he 
or she should be accorded. This is a potentially serious shortcoming of a reference dependent decision-
making process in a terrorism context. Individuals that are close to the set of remembered characteristics 
will be accorded more attention and those that are further away will be accorded less because of the 
attention that 𝑥𝑅  focuses and the diminishing sensitivity that decision-makers exhibit for cases that lie 
further and further away from 𝑥𝑅 . The investigative team will also form some subjective assessment of the 
likelihood that a watch listed individual will engage in a serious action within a given period. This will be 
shaped by the probability domain that underlies the set of remembered characteristics that form the 
foundation for the reference point.  
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 Assume that the investigative team determines (subjectively) a set of probabilities that they attach 
to each watch listed individual to reflect the likelihood that the individual will perpetrate an act of 
terrorism. The determination of probabilities can be prone to error but the main point that we want to 
highlight here is the effect of over-weighting or under-weighting of the probabilities once (and however 
accurately) they are determined. This applies even if the assessment of likelihood is implicit, as it will be 
unless some formal process or technique is used. The extreme probabilities of 0 and 1 operate as dual 
reference points that focus the attention in the same way as our set of remembered characteristics (𝑥𝑅). 
The distance between the subjective or implicit likelihood attached to the watch listed individual’s chance 
of perpetrating an act of terrorism and each of the two probability domain reference points will shape the 
weight that the investigative team assigns to the likelihood that the individual will offend. Whether the 
weight that is applied emerges from error or systematic aspects of the decision-making processes, there is 
a very real possibility that subjectively assigned probability weights lead to suboptimal threat assessments 
and suspect prioritisation.  
 Consider three individuals who have been identified as being ‘very unlikely’, ‘very likely’ and 
‘moderately likely’ in terms of the risk that they will perpetrate a terrorist action. Each falls into a particular 
probability range in the probability domain in Figure 2. The first watch listed individual falls into the south-
western region, the second into the north-eastern region and the third into the central region. The 
subjective weights that are attached to these determined likelihoods are inverse S-shaped through the 
probability domain, indicating diminishing sensitivity away from 0 and 1 likelihoods and systematic 
overweighting (underweighting) of lower (higher) probabilities. Any watch listed individual whose 
likelihood of perpetrating an action is less than 50 percent will be accorded a proportionally higher and 
higher decision weight while any watch listed individual whose likelihood of perpetrating an action is 
greater than 50 percent will be accorded a proportionally lower and lower decision weight.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
The influence of non-linear probability weighting, diminishing sensitivity (or attention) and the 0-
1 reference points that characterise the probability domain is summarised by Figure 2.72 The first watch 
listed individual, who has been identified as being ‘very unlikely’ to perpetrate an action, is accorded more 
than proportionate weight. The second is accorded less than proportionate weight and so is the third, 
though not to the same degree. The likelihood that the first watch listed individual perpetrates a terrorist 
action is over-weighted and the likelihood that the second or third individuals perpetrate a terrorist action 
is under-weighted. A source of potential error regarding the priority accorded to the third watch listed 
individual also lies in the relatively scant attention that he or she attracts. For watch listed individuals 
whose likelihood of perpetrating an action lies further and further away from 0 or 1, the less attention they 
are accorded.  
 The prioritisation process is not static. It is ongoing and any ordering that is determined is subject 
to continuous revision. Over time, the investigative team will experience successes (gains) and failures 
(losses), some of which may be more obvious than others. When the investigative team successfully 
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prioritises a watch listed individual, the team experiences a gain. When the investigative team fails to 
prioritise a watch listed individual, the team experiences a loss. These gains and losses shape decision-
making dynamically, introducing risk aversion and risk seeking into the process. The influence of these 
might be checked. Before that can be accomplished, however, a level of awareness must be established. 
Professional development exercises that introduce opportunities for feedback and reflection upon previous 
decisions are essential to establishing this awareness. Such exercises would be specifically designed to 
identify the ways in which risk preferences have shaped the decisions that were made. This is important 
because the influence of risk seeking and risk aversion on the outcomes of the decision-making process can 
be far-reaching. 
 Investigative teams must take risks in deciding to prioritise or deprioritise a watch listed 
individual. The task is not mechanical and the investigative team may adjust the amount of risk taking that 
characterises their approach to the prioritisation task. More risk taking may be associated with greater 
reliance on the least mechanical aspects of the evaluation process and vice versa. For example, the role that 
intuition is allowed to play. The intuition of professionals can be an essential if somewhat controversial 
element in the decision-making process.73 Decision-makers display a tendency to consolidate successes 
and protect their gains. When the investigative team experiences successes, the team’s risk aversion will 
tend to increase. The team has received positive recognition for its good work and seeks to protect the 
reputation that it has established. The task will be approached with more caution and, perhaps, more 
formally with more checking and double-checking of the conclusions that the team has reached. When the 
investigative team experiences losses, the team’s loss aversion will prompt a tendency towards more risk 
taking to recoup those losses and re-establish the team’s record or, potentially, save the team from 
reassignment. Under these circumstances the prioritisation task may be approached less formally with 
more weight given to intuition. In both cases, the judgements formed by the investigative team can be 
disrupted.  
 Before concluding, it is necessary to address another related and extremely robust behavioural 
characteristic: overconfidence. With regards to the scenario that we have just been discussing, we might be 
tempted to conclude that success breeds overconfidence and, therefore, more risk seeking behaviour. It is 
true, overconfidence does indeed foster risk seeking but not necessarily in a manner that contradicts the 
predictions of CPT. Rather, overconfidence complements the insights into decision-making that derive from 
CPT. Overconfidence of three varieties has been detected in virtually every context that has been studied: 
(1) people having overconfidence in their estimates; (2) people overestimating their abilities; and (3) 
people over-placing themselves relative to others.74 In a context characterised by risk and uncertainty, the 
primary impact of overconfidence on the outcomes of the decision-making process stems from its effect on 
probability estimates.  
As we have seen in our discussion of CPT, non-linear probability weightings emerge from the 
interaction of diminishing sensitivity and the 0 and 1 reference points in the probability domain. The 
decision weights imply no fundamental misunderstanding of the probability distribution on the part of the 
decision-maker. However, an overconfident decision-maker will systematically assign incorrect 
probabilities and, in consequence, the proportion of times the decision-maker is correct about an outcome 
will be lower than it would be if probabilities were correctly ‘calibrated’.75,76 The incorrect probabilities are 
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then weighted in the manner described by CPT leading to additional distortions.77 The combination of the 
behavioural characteristics embedded within CPT and the effects of overconfidence lead to errors in threat 
likelihood assessments that generate losses for the investigative team that foster the inherent risk seeking 




Suspect prioritisation is an essential component of the investigative process and no purely formal system 
can replace the decision-making process as it applies to this task. Given the size of the terrorism watch lists 
that have been built and are being managed across many jurisdictions, efficient prioritisation of watch 
listed individuals for investigation or surveillance is critical. In prioritising watch listed individuals, or even 
in deciding to place an individual on a terrorism watch list in the first place, law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies make decisions in a complex environment characterised by risk and uncertainty. The 
decision-making processes that are brought to bear on the task are potentially subject to the same biases 
that have been identified over many decades of experimental and empirical research by decision theorists. 
 Much research has been accorded to the ways in which decision-makers rank or order alternatives 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty. There are many different complementary perspectives from 
which to view the problem. In this paper, we have used the most prominent theoretical framework, CPT, to 
explore the decision-making processes that are applied to the task of prioritising watch listed individuals. 
CPT encompasses some of the most robust behavioural idiosyncrasies that have been repeatedly found to 
shape the ways in which alternatives are ranked. These include loss aversion, reference point dependence, 
risk seeking to avoid or recoup losses, risk aversion to consolidate or protect gains and reference point 
dependence. The subjective determination of probabilities and the subjective weighting of them is also 
central to the decision-making process described by prospect theory. By depicting the task of prioritising 
watch listed individuals as a task involving the ranking of alternatives under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty, we enable prospect theory as a perspective from which the problem can be viewed and by 
which the factors that may shape the outcome of the task can be brought into the foreground.  
 If our analysis is broken into its component parts, then perhaps our most important single point is 
our definition of the reference point that operates in this context. As a set of remembered (available) 
characteristics, the reference point is itself the product of a heuristic. Attention is focused on those 
characteristics of the watch listed individual that most closely align with the reference point. Because of 
diminishing sensitivity, watch listed individuals who are further and further away from the reference point 
receive less and less attention. The degree to which this is a problem depends on the degree to which the 
set of remembered characteristics, the reference point, correlates with the threat that individuals 
represent. A more formal system of categorising individuals on the basis of multiple criteria may mitigate 
the influence of reference point dependence. Peer reviews by different investigative teams may also 
mitigate the influence of any single team’s set of remembered characteristics.  
 In prioritising watch listed individuals, law enforcement operates under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty and must bear risk at each step in the process. There is the risk that resources will be wasted 
on a low threat individual who is accorded more priority. There is the risk that a terrorist action will be 
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perpetrated because a high threat individual was accorded lower priority. The investigative team’s 
preferences for risk will shape its decisions. Furthermore, as we have pointed out, risk preference will 
shape those decisions dynamically. Risk aversion will tend to emerge after a series of correct decisions 
(successes or gains). Risk seeking will tend to emerge after a loss. When combined with overconfidence 
and the inaccurate initial probability estimates that overconfidence helps to produce, the divergence from 
a well calibrated ranking of watch listed individuals may be substantial. Because the prioritisation process 
is never fully mechanical or driven entirely by a formal system, intuition and experience must enter into 
the decision-making process. Indeed, it is direct and indirect experience that determines the set of 
remembered characteristics that is the reference point. Ever present and essential, yet controlled to some 
degree by the procedural nature of the law enforcement agency itself, professional intuition may play a 
greater or lesser role in shaping the outcomes of the prioritisation process. Risk seeking loosens the 
structure around professional intuition.  
  Reference points (remembered characteristics), subjective probability weighting, loss aversion, 
risk seeking to avoid or recoup losses and risk aversion to consolidate or protect gains are several of the 
most robust behaviours observed by decision theorists experimentally and empirically over more than fifty 
years. For the effect of these types of behaviours on any particular task involving decision-making under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty to be recognised, the task itself must be viewed from the perspective of 
a behavioural model of decision-making. In this paper, we have re-worked some of the essential features 
of the task of prioritising watch listed individuals so that it can be viewed from such a perspective. The 
result is a more nuanced understanding of just how complex this task is and, we hope, an enhanced 
awareness of the subtle ways in which the outcomes of the decision-making processes applied to this task 
can be shaped by systematic features that characterise the ways in which humans approach the task of 
ordering alternatives in a risky and uncertain environment. Practically, these insights may be used as the 
foundation for training and development exercises that concentrate specifically on identifying the role that 
particular behavioural characteristics have played in the decision-making process and as the rationale for 
procedural changes that recognise the impact that these characteristics have, such as peer reviews 
designed to mitigate an investigative team’s set of remembered characteristics. Following periods in which 
deficiencies in the prioritisation process have become apparent, the structure of decision theory as we have 
applied it here may form the foundation for a review process aimed at improving the assessments of the 
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